Real Life Incident: Mooring Accident Takes Life Of Second Officer

The following incident highlights the importance of correct operating procedures, the design of the remote control box, its position, and how the ropes are led across the deck.

The after mooring party consisted of the Second Mate (2/O) and one Integrated Rating (IR). On the day of the accident the 2/O had just returned from leave and the IR had only been on the vessel for eight days. The IR arrived at the mooring platform before the 2/O. The speed of the winch drum was controlled by a “mooring valve” and the IR set the speed of this valve to that which had been normal practice of the officer who had left the ship that day.

The weather was fine, cloudy, with good visibility and a 15 knot wind from the North. The after mooring platform was dry and free from oil or grease. The 2/O wore a white boiler suit, a day-glow orange safety vest and wore substantial elastic-sided working boots. He had been in charge of the after mooring station in excess of 140 occasions and was in the habit of retrieving the mooring lines at maximum rate, even though he was aware of the dangers of rope whip and had discussed the danger with his colleagues.

The Master ordered all ropes to be “let go”. At the after mooring platform, the two mooring ropes from the red and green winches were released first. According to the IR, the 2/O controlled the recovery of the two ropes by the two centre (green and red) levers. The stern rope to the blue winch and the back spring to the yellow winch were then released. The IR volunteered to operate the blue lever, and the 2/O agreed.

Both the 2/O and the IR were at the ship’s side controls, the 2/O standing at the after end of the control box, between it and the after fairlead. The IR was at the forward end, standing between the control box and the fairlead at Frame 1. The rope to the yellow winch was led through the fairlead immediately forward of the control box, directing the 2/O’s attention in that direction. The IR operated the forward of the four levers (blue) controlling the stern rope, which was led through the fairlead immediately on the 2/O’s left side. With the release of the moorings, the stern began to drift off the quay.

The following sequence of events occupied between four and five seconds. The stern rope had been dropped on the quay, clear of the bollard and was being recovered. It dropped clear of the quay and swung parallel with the ship’s side without hitting the water or the square stern section of the ship.

According to the statement made by the IR, he thought the stern mooring rope was coming in “too fast” and turned around to ensure that the rope was stowing on the drum correctly. He turned back to see the eye of the mooring rope rotating rapidly above the 2/O’s head. He shouted a warning, released the blue winch control and tried to pull the 2/O back from the bulwark.

At the time, the 2/O was leaning over the bulwark, looking forward along the ship’s side, watching the yellow mooring rope. The eye of the blue rope became entangled with the 2/O’s upper body, pulling him over the side of the ship. The IR looked over the side and saw the 2/O floating face down in the water with blood coming from his head. The IR stated that, although he had released the winch control, the winch did not stop but continued to haul in the rope at maximum speed.

The bridge team saw the 2/O fall into the water, and the Master went immediately to the wheelhouse and pushed the main engine emergency stop buttons. He then called the Shipping Control Centre on VHF and requested the port emergency service. The Mate and Chief Integrated Rating rushed aft and were joined by the Probationary Integrated Rating (PIR).

The PIR stated that the blue winch drum was rotating slowly when he arrived at the mooring position. He went to the winch and moved the manual control lever on the winch to the stop position, and the drum ceased turning. He saw that the mooring control was set to maximum speed. The Master returned to the bridge wing and saw the 2/O face down in the water; there appeared to be a lot of blood. The body was later recovered from the water.

The subsequent investigation looked closely at the mooring operations and calculated that by the time the 6th layer of rope was going on to the winch drum, it was being recovered at more than twice the speed of recovery of the first layer and, with the winch at maximum speed, would be coming in at over 2m per second.

The arrangement of the remote control levers on the port side did not equate with the arrangement of the winches and, most importantly, the way the ropes were led across the deck and through the fairleads. This arrangement increased the risk to operators and particularly to the person operating the yellow winch.

From the evidence available, it was concluded that, when the 2/O initially arrived at the mooring position (after the IR) he reset the speed control on the blue winch, and possibly the other winches, to maximum speed. This action was apparently consistent with his usual practice and his reported nature of getting things done quickly and efficiently.

At a later date the inspectors witnessed a re-enaction of the recovery of the mooring line at full speed. When released the rope swung as a pendulum in an arc, which rapidly shortened in radius as it was recovered. The rope completed one single cycle in less than 4 seconds at which stage the energy stored in the remaining 3 to 4m of rope caused it to rotate rapidly and with great energy in an anti-clockwise motion. This “simulation” demonstrated that, with the mooring winch at full speed, under certain, quite common circumstances, the last few metres of mooring rope will rotate rapidly and with great energy, with a resulting risk to anyone leaning over the ship’s side within the scope of the rope end.

In the opinion of the Inspector, given that the rope was being retrieved at a rate estimated to be between 2m and 2.5m per second, the rating could have done nothing at that time to prevent the rope striking the 2/O. Proportional control of the winch drum could be achieved by holding the remote lever at the maximum angle until the winch had reached the required speed, that speed of recovery could then be maintained by moving the lever to an intermediate position. Crew members stated that they had understood that the ship’s side controls worked on a stop/go principle and that speed of recovery could only be set at the winch itself.

The report concluded that :

• The 2/O was lassoed by the eye of the mooring rope and thrown over and against the side of the ship.
• The accident was caused by the setting of the winches to maximum speed.
• Other factors included the position of the remote controls, the position of the levers within the remote control box relative to the ropes they controlled, the failure of the crew to realise that the ship’s side controls allowed the speed of recovery to be controlled and the failure of the ship’s crew to report the potential danger when it was known that mooring ropes were prone to whip.
• The shipboard staff were not properly instructed in the operation of the ship’s side control valves, specifically the proportional speed control.
• Given the rapidity with which the accident happened, the inspector is unable to conclude that the IR had time to operate the emergency stop, or that the misalignment of the blue winch (a fact discovered during the investigation but not included in these extracts), contributed towards the accident.
• No responsibility could be attributed to the IR.

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